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God in the nineteenth century: Wagner 
 
Sermon: Evensong, Trinity College Chapel, Cambridge, 26 October 2008 
 
Our hearts are thrilled with compassion, for it is old Jehovah himself who is making 
ready to die. We have known him so well, from his cradle in Egypt … We saw him bid 
farewell to those companions of his childhood, the obelisks and sphinxes of the Nile, 
to become a little god-king in Palestine to a poor nation of shepherds … We saw him 
move to Rome … he obtained power and, from the heights of the Capitol, ruled the 
city and the world, urbem et orbem. … We have seen him purify himself, spiritualise 
himself still more, become paternal, compassionate, the benefactor of the human race, 
a philanthropist … But nothing can save him! 
  
Do you not hear the bell? Down on your knees! The sacrament is being administered to 
a dying God! 
 
Heinrich Heine penned these words in 1834 – and, in many respects, they indicate rather well 
the state of God in mid-nineteenth century Europe, at least in intellectual circles. Nietzsche, 
after all, would report God’s death, not recommend it. 
 Wagner, in his Ring cycle, stood in such company; indeed, he knew Heine well. The 
composer fell greatly under the influence of Young Hegelian writers, who had declared that, 
whilst Hegel’s philosophy had helped to bridge a number of gaps that imperilled human 
flourishing – gaps between the dualisms of man and Nature, Spirit and Nature, knowledge 
and will, ‘ought’ and ‘is’, secular and divine, particular and universal, self and society – 
Hegel had ultimately fallen short of what he might have achieved by his insistence upon 
Christianity as the ultimate truth, instead of an historical stage on the road thereto. In his 
Essence of Christianity, Ludwig Feuerbach, to whom Wagner dedicated one of his theoretical 
works, had argued that alienating theology transferred authentic religious impulses, such as 
love, justice, and charity, to an object outside man. Now, however, was the moment to turn 
from God to man. In the Ring, Wagner celebrated a myth of the gods’ downfall.  Various 
dramatic treatments had been considered, with figures such as Apollo or the social-
revolutionary Jesus of Nazareth as harbingers of freedom, whatever that might entail, until 
Wagner settled upon Siegfried. But very soon, and not least in the light of his experience of 
revolutionary defeat in 1848-9 and his subsequent reading of the ‘pessimistic’, world-
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renouncing philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, Wagner, whilst retaining some of his 
revolutionary enthusiasm, came to see his apparent solution as having failed. Perhaps he had 
killed off the gods – or God – prematurely. Perhaps the death of God had also entailed the 
death of man. 
 Thus was the scene set for his final drama, Parsifal, perhaps the greatest example of a 
modern, even modernist, mystery play – and not only in the sense of an abiding mystery 
concerning whatever it might actually be ‘about’. Parsifal himself seems to be a different 
kind of hero: a charismatic hero, yes, but one who does not really do anything. The 
community of the Grail is in decline, perhaps terminally so; the drama concerns its rescue or 
salvation, which will not be accomplished by the fire of revolution.  A letter from 1862, 
when Wagner had broken off composition of Siegfried and was already thinking about 
Parsifal, is instructive: 
 
… the myth of a Messiah is the most profoundly characteristic of all myths for all our 
earthly striving. The Jews expected someone who would liberate them, a Messiah 
who was supposed to restore the Kingdom of David and bring not only justice but, 
more especially, greatness, power, and safety from oppression. Well, everything went 
as predicted, his birth in Bethlehem, of the line of David, the prophecy of the three 
wise men, etc., his triumphant welcome to Jerusalem, palms strewn before him, etc. – 
there he stood, everyone listened, and he proclaimed to them: ‘My kingdom is not of 
this world! Renounce your desires, that is the only way to be redeemed and freed!’ – 
Believe me, all our political freedom fighters strike me as being uncannily like the 
Jews. 
 
This is already quite a different Christ from the socialistic enemy of law and property 
envisaged in Wagner’s sketches for a drama on Jesus of Nazareth – or better, that Jesus still 
exists but has been built upon, his negations negated. He has been metaphysically redeemed 
from his narrowly political one-sidedness. Yet this is as nothing compared with what we 
heard in the lesson. Those words are spoken on Good Friday. Parsifal imagines essentially 
what we do when reading the narrative of Christ crucified, which we heard from St 
Matthew’s Gospel. 
 
Alas for that day of highest grief! 
Now I imagine that all that blooms, 
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all that breathes, lives, and lives anew, 
should only mourn and weep! 
 
We know that Easter is to come, although we also stand in the shadow of the Cross – and not 
only on Good Friday. Nor should we forget Hegel’s re-positioning of God’s death on the 
Cross at the very heart of faith, an attribute, he claimed, which starkly distinguished 
Christianity from natural- and folk-religions. Yet the words in Parsifal we heard from the 
apparently wise Gurnemanz present a very different resurrection strategy: 
 
You see that it is not so. 
It is today that the tears of repentant sinners 
water field and meadow with holy dew: 
thus are they made to flourish. 
Now does all Creation rejoice 
in the Saviour’s dear path, 
and dedicates to Him its prayer. 
It cannot see Him Himself upon the Cross; 
it looks up to man redeemed, 
who feels himself freed from the burden of sin and horror, 
made pure and whole through God’s loving sacrifice. 
 
 So what has happened to Christ, if indeed that be who ‘the Saviour’ is? (I think that 
He is, although it is perhaps worth mentioning that He is never mentioned by name in the 
drama. Unfortunately, I shall have to put this matter to one side.) Either Christ has been 
brought down from the Cross or those who put Him there have been prevented from doing 
so. Michael Tanner, one of the most astute Wagnerian critics, is, I think, right to say that 
Wagner ‘is repelled by the idea of the Second Person of the Holy Trinity dying in order that 
the First Person should allow man into Heaven’. Or at least he is right about this stage in the 
drama, for a key to Wagner’s greatness is his relentless self-questioning, both from work to 
work and within works. At this stage, it is quite true that we turn instead to Nature and to the 
extraordinary claim that Nature, absolved from sin, has been granted its day of innocence. 
The Fall, it seems, might have been suspended – or is there already a caveat, in referring to 
Nature, rather than to man? It would seem so, since man could hardly be redeemed without 
something, some sin, from which to be redeemed. Sin, whether from Adam or no, is still 
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operative, if on the defensive – although we should remember the audacity of making this 
claim on Good Friday of all days. 
 But what if it is not Good Friday, which Wagner may be portraying as an example of 
what is to come, or may be presenting as something unique, for one day only? What if we are 
not standing with such overwhelming directness either in the shadow of the Cross or in 
Wagner’s Nature transformed? This is where Wagner attempts to grapple with an issue he 
might once have written off as only presenting itself were one to take an ill-advised turn 
toward the transcendental.  
For hesitantly, ambiguously, yet unmistakeably, we see introduced that Third Person 
of the Trinity Michael Tanner forewent to mention. What Parsifal has learned on the travels 
preceding our excerpt is emphatically not to be attributed to his own agency, nor even to that 
of any other mortal. Whether secular or atheist commentators like it or not, this is the realm 
not just of self-realisation, but also and primarily of grace, the divine gift that might alleviate 
the sorry lot of man’s sinful existence. When, in the Third Act, Parsifal returns to Monsalvat 
in search of the Grail, he succeeds through the intervention of something higher, which 
imparts to him knowledge that he could never have obtained through his own offices. It is 
this and this alone that enables him finally to carry out his deed, to heal the high priest 
Amfortas’s wound, thereby to put Amfortas out of his eternal agony and, crucially, to 
rejuvenate the religious community. Grace supplants or at least enables self-realisation. 
Tanner argues that there is ‘no point in Parsifal’s development at which one could say that 
without the intervention of divine grace he would have remained powerless to accomplish his 
mission’. Yet this is to ignore the several, far-from-incidental references to grace (Gnade) in 
Wagner’s text, its first theological usage in a Wagner drama since the 1840s.  
Parsifal’s concern with Christianity is far from incidental, in that it enables 
exploration both of the cyclical (Schopenhauerian) and teleological (Hegelian) – or, if you 
prefer, and to generalise excessively, the archetypal Greek and Jewish strands of the faith. 
Parsifal, like Christianity, is neither merely cyclical nor straightforwardly linear. Into the 
age-old conflict between time and the eternal, Wagner introduces a crucial Christian agency 
of mediation, that gift from God commonly and often confusingly known as ‘grace’, which 
for us may be considered to represent a decisive act. In the words of the New Testament 
scholar, James Dunn, ‘In Paul ... χαρις is never merely an attitude or disposition of God 
(God’s character as gracious); consistently it denotes something much more dynamic – the 
wholly generous act of God. Like “Spirit,” with which it overlaps in meaning  ..., it denotes 
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effective divine power in the experience of men.’ Now this is not meant in a Young 
Hegelian, detranscendentalising manner, bringing the divine back down to earth in the 
greatest deeds of man. Nor, however, is it quite so inconsistent as one might imagine; for 
Wagner, finding that manner insufficient, attempts to redeem what might be of worth in it. 
We certainly go beyond some vague ‘redemption’ of Nature, beyond the old monistic trap of 
elevating it above Spirit – or man. 
Wagner had, rightly, always been concerned most profoundly with the abiding 
problem of modern politics: how to reconcile the apparently idyllic communal integration of 
Hellenic life with the post-Classical, Christian conception of subjectivity. For us, the 
Incarnation has changed everything. But in the world in which, as Wagner put it, the cloister 
had replaced the amphitheatre, the consequences had been far from uniformly beneficial. 
This was not the world in which, as eighteenth-century deists such as Voltaire had naïvely 
fancied, all would thank God for His goodness by dint of wonder at His Creation. The 
situation was rather, as Wagner bewailed, that ‘our God is money, our religion its 
acquisition.’ Gone was the Greek religion of art, or art of religion. Public life had vanished. 
Man’s purpose having been located outside his earthly existence, life could ‘remain the 
object of man’s care only with respect of his most unavoidable needs’. This was the state of 
affairs that had led Wagner to the barricades, to restore the dignity and unity of art and 
religion. But he also eventually came to point us to the eminently orthodox realisation that 
our own efforts will never, can never be sufficient. Experience had taught him that hard truth 
and enabled him to point us to the realm of grace, which in turn points us to the indivisibility 
of the Holy Trinity. The enigmatic final words of Parsifal – ‘Redemption to the Redeemer’ – 
suggest that, even if this were not the intention, the nineteenth-century death of God, far from 
being unduly exaggerated, was entirely necessary, just like that on the Cross, and should 
certainly not be ignored by those of us living in its wake. Its piercing agony stands at the very 
heart of our faith, enabling and necessitating His Resurrection, both in history and in eternity.  
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